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An investigation is made into the interrelationships
between the discipline of production management and the
project management process. Tv/o specific examples are
presented which demonstrate the impact of production manage-
ment in the system life cycle of an acquisition program.
Information gathered by personal interviews, field trips,
questionnaire analysis, and literature review is presented
which portrays the significant value that a knowledge of
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I. INTRODUCTION
The project management approach to the acquisition of
major weapons systems has been the subject of many reports,
studies, and directives in recent years. Although numerous
aspects of this management tool have been explored in depth,
the authors feel that the relationship between project
management and industrial engineering and/or production
management has not been given the attention and exposure
that it warrants. It will be the objective of this thesis
to demonstrate the importance of production management to the
project management organization and to portray the significant
role played by industrial engineering/production management
in specific phases of the weapon systems acquisition process.
A three pronged approach was made toward gathering the
information required for such an analysis. These were:
1. A comprehensive literature search of books, periodi-
cals, theses, directives, reports, studies, and questionnaires
developed for previous studies.
2. Intervievrs with civilian and military project managers.
Naval Plant Representative Office (NAVPRO) personnel, in-plant
Within the Navy, the terms "project management" and
"project manager" are considered to be synonymous with the
phrases "program management" and program manager" as used in
DOD directives and civilian industry. The word "project" will
be used in lieu of "program" throughout t^is paper.

production personnel, and academic personnel familiar with
both production and project management.
3. Field trips to the production facilities of civilian
corporations and government-owned-contractor-operated (GOCO)
plants.
This process enabled viewpoints to be obtained from many
diverse interests and at the same time permitted the authors
to obtain a good familiarity vrith the day-to-day working
environment in production facilities v/hich ranged from ultra-
modern to near obsolete and which were operating from one-
fourth to full capacity.

II. DEFINITION OF TFRMS
Prior to embarking on a discussion tracing the subject
interrelationships, it is necessary to define some terms so
that a base for the ensuing discussion may be established.
A. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
The concept of program or project management has long
been a management tool of civilian corporations which served
to provide a focus of resources and direction on particular
programs within the corporate structure. The foundation for
utilizing this approach v/ithin the military for the acquisi-
tion of major weapons systems is found in Department of
Defense Directive 5000.1 which calls for the management of
the development and production of major defense systems by a
single individual— the project manager. The scope of duties
envisioned by this technique are summed up in the following
quotation
:
The concept of program management is to provide centralized
management authority over all of the technical and business
aspects of a program. The program manager's role, then, is
to tie together, to manage, to direct the development and
production of a system meeting performance, schedule, and
cost objectives which are defined by his Service and
approved by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) . The essence
of the program manager's role is to be the agent of the
Service in the management of the system acquisition process,
to focus the authority and responsibility of the Service
for tuning the program. He has the vantage of a large
perspective of the program and the interrelationships among
its elements. He must be the major motive force for pro-
pelling the system through its evolution. [LOGISTICS
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, 19 71]

While a major focus of this thesis will be on the project
manager himself, the subject of project management will be
addressed in much broader terms so as to uncover the contri-
butions to the total program effort by the lower echelons of
management in the area of production management/industrial
engineering. For example, the duties of the staff of a Naval
Plant Representative Office will be discussed.
B. SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
The life cycle of a system refers to the futuristic
philosophy that recognizes the events that will effect a
system during the period of its existence--f irst as an idea
and then as a piece of hardware. Although the phrases used
to describe the various stages in the life of a system change
over time, the concept remains the same. Figure 1, System
Life Cycle, presents one graphical expression of this con-
cept. Our primary areas of concern will be those segments
shown as the Planning and Acquisition Periods as these periods
are normally administered through the project management
technique.
C. PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT/INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING
These two terms have had many meanings over the years but
application of the scientific method to man's thinking on
management and production principles and methods has resulted
in the emergence of a scientific form of management which has
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come to be known as production management. During this
evolutionary process, these two terms have merged to the
extent that they appear to be mutual subsets of each other
in the current literature. Modern definitions of each will
serve to support this contention.
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING - is concerned with the design,
improvement, and installation of integrated systems of
men, materials, and equipment. It draws upon specialized
knowledge and skill in the mathematical, physical, and
social sciences, together with the principles and methods
of engineering analysis and design to specify, predict,
and evaluate the results to be obtained from such systems.
[MAYNARD, 1971]
PRODUCTION r^NAGEMENT - the art and science of properly
and efficiently using men, money, and machines, materials
and processes to economically generate goods and services.
[AIR FORCE SYSTEMS C0M14AND , 19 71]
In view of these definitions, these terms will subsequently
be considered synonymous in this paper. Further, since the
term "production manager" is normally reserved for a specific
top management position, those personnel who practice the art
of production management will be referred to as industrial
engineers
.
Moving from generalities to specifics, modern production
management is envisioned as consisting of the following
disciplines and/or activities: [MAYNARD, 1971]
1. Selection of processes and assembling methods.
2. Selection and design of tools and equipment (tooling).
3. Design of facilities, including layout of buildings,
machines and equipment; material handling equipment,
raw materials and product storage facilities.
4. Design/improvement of planning and control systems for
distribution of goods and services, production, inven-
tory, quality, plant maintenance and engineering.

5. Development of cost control systems such as budgetary
controls, cost analysis, and standard cost systems.
6. Product development.
7. Design and installation of value engineering and
analysis systems.
8. Design and installation of management information
systems.
9. Development and installation of wage incentive systems.
10. Development of performance measures and standards
(including work measurement and evaluation systems)
.
11. Development and installation of job evaluation systems.
12. Evaluation of reliability and performance.
13. Operations Research, including such items as mathemati-
cal analyses, systems simulation, linear programming,
and decision theory.
14. Design and installation of data processing systems.
15. Office systems, procedures and policies.
16. Organizational planning.
17. Plant location surveys which consider potential markets
for the plant, raw material sources, labor supply, -
financing and taxes
.
From this comprehensive listing, it should be apparent
that production management has progressed a long way since
its identification with solely Time and Motion Studies and
Plant Layout. Further, documentation is available that indi-
cates that a high degree of commonality exists in the subject
matter content of production management as viewed by industry
and the academic community [WILSON, 1953].
Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to link production
management to the project management process is the DOD
Systems and Equipment Planning Guide [LOGISTICS r4ANAGEMENT
10

INSTITUTE, 1969]. Recognizing production management as an
integrating function, given time and cost constraints, it is
viewed as consisting of the following elements:
1. Producibility
2. Plans and controls for configuration, quality





5. Equipment and tools
6. Facilities
7. Industrial support
8. Personnel and training
9. Funding
10. Control data
A similar Air Force publication [AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND,
1971] expands these elements further. Both documents focus
on the attitude that management attention has been too long
directed toward technical development problems at the expense
of production efficiency. This group of ten elements is
considered to be a more concise and manageable description
of the scope of production management than the seventeen
items previously listed. All subsequent discussion will




III. PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT AND WFAPONS SYSTEMS ACQUISITION
A. IMPACTS ON SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
The objective of the Weapon System Acquisition process is
to obtain a weapon system that meets its performance specifi-
cations, on schedule, and within cost. To achieve this
objective production management must be a consideration long
before the production phase of the system life cycle is
entered. It must begin in the concept formulation stage and
continue throughout the acquisition period if the large cost
savings attainable in the production phase are to be realized.
Figure 2, Impacts of Early Production Planning, and Figure 3,
The Pattern of Deeper Involvement and Decreasing Options,
rather vividly demonstrate the truth of the preceding state-
ments. The cross-over point for both graphs occur near the
end of the validation phase (which correlates to the system
definition phase in Figure 1) . Beyond these points commit-
ment to decisions made in the conceptual and system definition
phases of the life cycle is increased due to decision inflex-
ibility caused in large part by the drastically increased
unit cost of making changes.
Integrated planning for production throughout the planning
and acquisition periods facilitates achievement of lower cost
per unit throughout the life cycle of the weapons system. Each



























to demonstrate the inter-relationships of production manage-
ment to systems acquisition.
The primary source documents utilized in examining each
of the following phases of the system life cycle v/ere the
Guide for Integration of Planning for Production
,
[DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE, 1969] and POD Systems and Equipment Production
Planning Guide
,
[LOGISTICS MANAGEMFNT INSTITUTE, 1969].
1. Concept Formulation
In this initial phase the need for new military
capability is realized and a concept which v/ill provide this
capability is conceived. The process is iterative in nature
and is supported by various experiments, tests and analyses.
The result is a description of an operational capability and
a weapons system to fulfill it. It is in this phase that
the weapon systems requirements are identified through a
program plan which broadly defines and quantifies the per-
formance, cost, and schedule objectives. It is necessary in
this phase to develop production feasibility estimates for
each of the alternative weapons systems. Consideration must
be given to the adequacy of present production techniques
,
requirements for interchangeability , availability of critical
raw materials, and the necessity for long lead production
capabilities. The results of these deliberations are col-
lated into a production plan which includes not only the
production elements cited earlier, but also production
quantities, mobilization policy, automated programiriing for
15

tools and configuration management, quality, cost and schedule
controls, and flexibility.
Although this phase of a system life cycle is
generally characterized as being the least costly, that is
probably true only in an accounting sense. If the cost
incurred in other phases of the system life cycle due to
inadequate planning in the concept formulation phase v/ere to
be applied to its accounting cost then the true cost of
concept formulation might be realized.
2. System Definition
In the system definition phase preliminary designs
and engineering for the weapon system are verified or accom-
plished, management plans are made, proposals for engineering
development are solicited and evaluated, and the development
contractor is selected. The objective is to verify the
soundness of the early conception effort and to insure that
the technical and economic bases for initiating full scale
development of the weapon system are valid.
Contractor response to the Request For Proposal (RFP)
,
offered during this phase, will be effected by the require-
ments laid down in the RFP. These requirements must be such
as to permit evaluation of contractor proposals for 1) the
degree to which they meet or exceed minimum requirements for
production; 2) comparative credibility of their production
cost estimates and impact on life cycle costs; 3) comparative
producibility and risk of their manufacturing processes;
4) an effective plan for demonstrating the product against
16

production specifications and 5) the adequacy of their make/
buy relationships.
Again all the elements of production must be examined
as to their criteria for planning, the proposals for their
make-up, and final approval of their plans. Taken together,
the individual element plans will constitute the production
development plan.
3. Design
This phase begins a massive commitment of resources,
for it is here that the total system, including all items
necessary for support, is specified in detail, developed,
fabricated in limited quantities, tested and evaluated. Most
of the research and development monies allocated to the
system are expended here.
The production of test units during this phase, in
accordance with the production development plan, provides
the opportunity to refine system design, resource allocations,
and production processes. Generally it is the phase in which
the "bugs" are ironed out, not only in the system test models
but the production plan itself. Throughout this phase produc-
tion m^anagement guidance for each of the production elements
is required to assure that each of the element requirements
are properly generated, interfaced and programmed into the
production plan. It is here, concurrent with the production
of test, units, that planning for the operational units must
be done. The production plan must include the changes in
design and support that become apparent from system and
17

subsystem testing. Any other changes should have been made
early in this phase and in any event all changes must be
monitored for their impacts upon production and material
requirements
.
The outputs from this phase are a complete and
detailed system definition, test and evaluation results, a
firm production plan, and cost targets for hardware and
supporting items.
4 . Production
This phase begins when the production contract is
negotiated and awarded. It is in production where the
greatest commitment is made with TGspect' to total resof.rces.
Public announcement of the contract, the extensive time and
monies committed, and the needs of the operating forces pre-
clude turning back.
The production plan is implemented and production
thresholds are monitored. Production extends somewhat into
the deployment phase which may result in subsequent modifi-
cations of the original system. In any event, modification
may result either from system deficiencies showing up in use
or for modernization purposes. Thus the use of the production
base line plan may extend far beyond the production phase
itself though the plan will no doubt be modified considerably.
The preceding discussion was not intended to be com-
prehensive by any means. The sole purpose v;as to demonstrate
that production is a factor for consideration in every phase
of the weapons system acquisition cycle. Further amplifica-























































which illustrates the production cycle contained within the
system acquisition cycle.
B. PRODUCIBILITY/CHANGE CONTROL
The pervasiveness of production management throughout the
system life cycle might be considered sufficient evidence
that more than a cursory knowledge of production management
would be of benefit to the project manager. However, further
support for this contention will be gained through the
examination of two subsets of production management: pro-
ducibility and change control. It would be presumptuous to
\
say that these two areas are more important than the other
elements of production management, but they arose as separate
topics for discussion in almost all of the interviews the
authors conducted. Additionally, each of these areas has
received increased emphasis of late and are likely to be
topics for discussion for some time in the future.
1 . Producibility
The term"producibility" has been used for a few years,
but often with varied meanings and in different contexts.
Often it is confused with the terms production capability or
production feasibility which both refer to a determination
that the system can be fabricated.
Producibility is an element of production management
planning. It is defined by those characteristics that lead
to the most effective and economic means of fabrication,
assembly, inspection, test, installation, checkout, and
20

acceptance of systems or equipment through the production
planning and equipment design processes. These considerations
include materials, tooling, test equipment, facilities,
people, and procedures; all of which support the production
cycle. Since it is an element of production planning, pro-
ducibility must also be a consideration through the system
life cycle. The earlier producibility is a consideration the
more likely operational and economical trade-offs of the
equipment design, support, and production requirements will
take place. The end result of this action would be increased
production effectiveness at lower total cost. Thus pro-
ducibility has to be a consideration in the concept formula-
tion phase and a producibility plan must be devised
enumerating producibility goals for design definition,
production specifications, and actual measurement of produc-
ibility itself. This plan in turn would become part of the
overall production plan. Additionally, to facilitate dealing
with the contractor some criteria must be established to
evaluate the contractor's ability to develop a producible
system design. If he is working up the preliminary design
he should be contracturally obligated to develop producibility
characteristics and goals to be used in his design and pro-
duction planning requirements. Such design guidelines might
be:




2. Constraints on the application of processes, such as
forming, bending, machining, etc.
3. Requirements for selection of design alternatives
permitting achievement of designated production line
capabilities
.
4. Constraints on employment of high risk vs. proven
methods and processes.
5. Constraints on tooling development vs. utilization
of available equipment.
In fulfilling the preceding with respect to the con-
tractor it would be reasonable to expect a disagreement (s)
to arise with the government over the criteria established
for producibility or over the actual determination of what
constitutes an effective producibility analysis. In such
event the Air Force Systems Command Manual on Production
Management provides excellent guidance:
In this area the interests of the government and the con-
tractor may conflict, with the latter 's analysis of
producibility and recommended approaches to quantity
production unduly influenced by the desire to employ his
peculiar capabilities, proprietary processes, and maintain
his working force. The contract adm.inistration services
production personnel should effect involvement with
contractor design engineering in sufficient depth to avoid
such subjectivity and provide program management with an
appreciation where design proposals, configuration manage-
ment documentation (for example: specifications, trade-off
studies, and producibility analysis), and production plans
reflect approaches which require the program to underwrite
extra expenses through resort to unnecessarily
costly or comparatively inefficient quantity production
practices
.
Within the last few years the idea of producibility
has become increasingly important. It is viewed as a means
22

to combat the ever increasing cost of acquiring new weapons
systems. Producibility departments are being set up within
organizations to insure its benefits are extracted. Another
factor promoting producibility is the advent of the "Design
to Cost" concept within DOD . This will place added emphasis
on producibility for some time in the future.
"Design to Cost" is a phrase used in DOD since 1969.
No standard, or rather official, definition of this term has
been promulgated to date. The generally accepted interpre-
tation is as follows:
Cost parameters shall be established which consider the
cost of acquisition and ownership; discrete cost elements
(e.g., unit production cost, operating and support cost)
shall be translated into "design to" requirements. System
development shall be continuously evaluated against these
requirements with the same rigor as that applied to tech-
nical requirements. Practical tradeoffs shall be miade
between system capability, cost and schedule. [DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5000.1, 1971]
Close examination of the quotation reveals a remark-
able similarity to the concept of producibility. The
difference lies in the emphasis on cost. The authors submit
that if an item or component is evaluated as to its capability
of being produced and its optimization of material applica-
tions, manufacturing methods, fabrication processes, produc-
tion schedules, personnel training requirements, and costs
then not only are the objectives of producibility fulfilled,
but also those of "design to cost." "Design to Cost" is in
essence producibility with a cost bias. For this reason
producibility, as an element of production management, will




2 . Change Control
A quotation from a recent General Accounting Office
report demonstrating the magnitudes of the cost growth
problem serves as an excellent introduction to f^e topic of
change control.
Cost histories of 45 systems under development on June 30,
1972, shov7 that current estimates of cost to acquire the
systems increased by some 31.5 billion dollars--39 per cent
over the planning estimates and 19.1 Billion dollars--2n
per cent over the development estimates. It is these
widely publicized overruns that have shaken public confi-
dence in the ability and credibilitv of both government and
industry managements. [GFNFRAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 197 3]
The cost growth figures cited are based on unit costs
of the system. Causes for these cost changes are attributed to
1. inaccuracy of original estimates
2. inflation
3. revisions to the specif ications--time schedules,
quantities, or engineering changes
The relative condition of each of these causes to total cost
growth is depicted in Figure 5, What Causes Overruns?.
The largest contributor to cost growth is changes in
the requirements. Fngineering changes (synonymous with
design changes), in particular, have the capability of not
only revising specifications but impacting on schedule. If
the cost of making these changes is great enough it may even
force a reduction of quantities ordered, in turn driving up costs.
The reason for engineering changes range from new
mission requirements established by DOD , to faulty perfor-
mance specifications, to misunderstanding of contract terms.






















were brought about by the adoption of concurrency, (i.e.,
production was started before development was complete) . As
a result many problems dealing with the design of the system
did not surface until after other units were proceeding
through production. Concurrency, though warranted in
special circumstances is discouraged in the large complex
weapon system acquisitions as official policy.
Another reason promoting engineering changes is that
the contractor line production organization that ends up with
the production task frequently has had little direct influence
on the original production decision. This means that antici-
pated costs, methods, and tooling have been established by
personnel or organizations remote from the parts making
responsibility. Problems in establishing efficient produc-
tion procedures are then reflected in costs. Development
oriented personnel, both DOD and contractor, who may have
been the driving force in the generation of new methods or
products frequently have a very shallow knov/ledge of the
degree of in-process product and process definitions required
to guarantee trouble free production. The end result is
either an inefficient production process or engineering
changes, or both.
Knowing why engineering changes occur is im.portant,
but understanding why they contribute so much to cost pro-
duces a. valuable insight to the problem. It is with this in
mind that the following discussion is directed. Figure 6,











the Industrial Engineering Manager of an aerospace firm
indicated was fairly typical of at least the aerospace
industry with perhaps broader application to other industries.
Referring to this figure, the numbers through 22 do not
indicate successive steps but are used simply as a reference
aid for ease of discussion. Initially the functions through
7 would be encompassed in the system definition phase of the
life cycle and functions 7 through 14 the design phase.
Once production prototypes had completed testing then the
production in quantity would commence at number 14 and work
through to number 21. The interesting aspect of Figure 6
is that any engineering changes must begin at number n
regardless of how far along the system might be in the pro-
duction program. Figure 7, General Operating System, more
clearly illustrates the steps required to process an
engineering change. It then becomes evident the personnel
performing the functions from to 14, or those cited in
Figure 1 , must be maintained in many cases simply to process
the engineering changes which historically always occur.
This being true, it is easy to see why it becomes so diffi-
cult and expensive to implement changes when the system goes
beyond the system definition phase. More succinctly:
The burden of maintaing a smooth, uniform flow of trouble-
free production under effective cost control is not com-
patible with new ideas. [WEISMANTELE, 19 69]
The above quotation points to the need for change
controls. Such controls are often established vis-a-vis the
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these procedures are looked upon as administrative in nature
when in fact they have a very definite impact on the produc-
tion process.
It is vital that the project manager and his staff
recognize the need for controlling engineering changes, not
just from the dollar standpoint, but from a production stand-
point. Viewing the impact from a production standpoint will
easily translate into dollar impact, but has the additional
advantage of promoting insight into the real problem. .. that
problem being, of course, to keep a focus on schedule and





Three principle sources were used in attempting to vali-
date the conclusions of the previous section regarding the
impact of production management on the project management
process. These were questionnaire analysis, personal inter-
view and observation, and literature review. Because of the
range and depth of the material uncovered, each area merits
individual discussion.
A. QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS
The questionnaire referred to is one that was developed
by a faculty/student committee at the Naval Postgraduate
School in April 1971 [ERICKSON, et al , 1972]. Its purpose
was to provide an input from personnel with significant
experience in the area of project management to assist the
committee in its task of formulating a graduate curriculum
in Weapons System Acquisition Management (VJSAM) . The majority
of recipients of the questionnaire were present or previous
Navy Project Managers; however, some questionnaires were
distributed to other senior military officers and civilians
associated with the acquisition of major weapons systems in
the Department of Defense.
The questionnaire was particularly valuable to our research
effort because of its recent dating and because it elicited
from many major participants in the project management
process their views on many aspects of this process.
31

particularly production management and the project manager.
Additionally, the original questionnaires as returned by
the recipients, were available. This reservoir of infor-
mation allowed the authors to forego the time consuming and
expensive process of contacting a large sampling of project
management personnel which would have been an otherwise
necessary part of our research effort.
The respondents were first asked to rank fourteen subject
areas, one of them being production management, on a scale
from zero to ten (zero = low importance; ten = high impor-
tance) with regard to their importance to a project manager.
The fourteen subject areas were:
1. General Management
2. Financial Management
3. Procurements and Contract Administration















Tabulation of the questionnaire results indicated that
Production Management v/as ranked seventh in importance by
the respondents. Further analysis of the results revealed
that of one hundred and seven (107) questionnaires avail-
able for inspection, 67 or 62.6% scored Production Manage-
ment betv/een seven and ten. This would indicate more than
a cursory interest in this area by project management
personnel.
Production Management as defined in the questionnaire
included the following subject material, ordered with
decreasing importance as determined by the results of a







7. Inspection and acceptance
8. DCAS (Defense Contract Admiinistration Services)
9. Value engineering
10. Industrial engineering
11. Industrial labor problems
Reference to our adopted definition of production management
will reveal that each of the topics addressed in the above
listing fall within its scope. Of even more significance,
however, were a number of specific comments provided by the
33

respondents regarding Production Management and its various
subject areas as defined by the questionnaire. It is informa-
tive to list a few of them:
Since Project Manager training will be useful for NAVPRO
and DCAS duty, this is a desirable area.
Knowledge in these areas will certainly provide a good
background for the day-to-day contact with the contractor.
Consider this a highly essential area.
A significant omission is that of planning and control
which I would rate 10 vis-a-vis the other items.
.
Summary treatment of this element will equip the Project
Manager to understand the importance of these topics when
he deals with production oriented personnel.
Most project officer personnel are short on the art of
system design with a view tov/ards manufacturing produc-
ibility and ship installation.
I doubt that this stuff can be taught effectively in a cram
course--again, the proper project manager selectee has become
exposed through "on the job training" and this would be a
useful refresher. His production staff on the other hand
should be deeply involved all the time and his job is to
see that they are on top of their problems.
Production is not done by the acquisition manager, but he
must have thorough understanding of production methods and
problems
.
Important to have skills to personally monitor and evaluate
contractor's performance.
The objective of the weapon system acquisition process is
to produce hardware for the operating forces of the Navy and
Marine Corps. Therefore, production must be successfully
managed regardless of other program successes.
NAVAIR has a strong production group and in the project
office is represented by an assistant project manager
experienced in these elements.
The project manager should have a good general feel for
what is happening to his end item during the production
cycle but need not have a great deal of expertise since he
will always be able to get help from those who are produc-




A good production manager is a must on the WSA Manager's
team. Tell him what you want accomplished—not how to do
it!
I consider a contractor, part and parcel, a large part of
the ACQUISITION TEAM. Hands off policy is killing the
government, and we must recognize the MILITARY/INDUSTRIAL
Team as the Acquisition Team. Let the contract officer/
negotiator do their job in support of the Acquisition
Manager, not in spite of nor in a void.
DCAS organization needs to be utilized m.ore heavily.
Engineering capability of DCAS is not widely enough known
and possibly their depth is insufficient to establish a
reputation.
He should know a lot about acceptance criteria, quality
control, configuration control. He must be knowledgeable
about Engineering changes and understanding of contractor
problems. In general, I don't think, he gets involved in
details of production management and only those aspects
wherein an understanding may help explain delays or
quality need be addressed. He needs to know about the
DCAS and PLANTREPO functions because he will be dealing
with these organizations.
These should all be taught within the framework of DCAS
and its responsibility in these areas, with emphasis on
how to use and influence the DCAS organization.
It is apparent from these quotations, there is a wide
diversity of opinion on the depth of involvement of the
project manager himself in the production process. Note-
worthy, however, is the emphasis on the proper utilization
by the project manager of other members of the project manage-
ment team in this area. To do this it would seem desirable
that the project manager have more than a cursory familiarity
with the elements of production management. Further, since
the above comments tend to spotlight efficient and full
utilization of the NAVPRO and DCAS organizations, it is only
reasonable to assume that the personnel staffing these groups
35

should also be possessed of more than superficial knowledge
in this discipline.
B. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS
1 . Interviews
a. Academia Representatives
Contacts with this group were rather limited
principally due to the fact that there are few members of
the academic community that are reasonably familiar with both
production management and the project management concept.
However, two ideas regarding the role of production manage-
ment in the project management process did surface.
The first concept involved the interfacing
process joining the design engineer and the production process
Figure 8, The Role of Producibility , depicts this relation-
ship and serves to expand the terra Producibility, which was
previously discussed. For the present, suffice it to say
that the academic community envisioned producibility as the
main production management concern of the project manager
in the design phase of the system life cycle while the pre-
ponderance of production management expertise would be
utilized in the production phase of the life cycle.
The second contribution of the academic community
to the research effort concerned the stimulation of the
This remark could equally be applied to personnel of the
supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) organization, the ship-









THE ROLE OF PRODUCIBILITY
awareness that an intuitive "feel" for "what it takes to
make things" was an essential ingredient for a successful
project management staff. It was noted that this intangible
perception ability often eluded many individuals and greatly
impaired their ability to function in an industrial environ-
ment. This "feel" became a goal of our research effort
through the mechanism of field trips to industrial facilities.
b. Civilian Project (Program) Managers
The personnel interviewed in this phase of our
research had all functioned as the civilian counterpart of
a military project manager in at least one Department of
Defense sponsored system acquisition process. Consequently,
they were eminently qualified to comment on the production
management involvement of military project managem.ent personnel
37

As was the case with the questionnaire respon-
dents, a large diversity of opinion was evident with regard
to the importance of production management to the project
manager. Interestingly enough, the attitude seemed to vary
with the academic background and experience of the inter-
viewee. Those with production management in their background
(either academic or on-the-job experience) considered it to
be an essential knowledge requirement of any project manager.
On the other hand, those interviewees lacking in a production
management background felt that military project management
personnel needed only an understanding of the terminology of
production so, as they stated, "I won't have to educate them."
Significant deviations from the above pattern
were also noted, however. In one particular case, a project
manager who subscribed to the "terminology only" philosophy
physically moved his entire project staff into the production
plant to constantly monitor the production process because
"it was necessary to get the job done"— an overriding con-
sideration of all the project managers interviewed.
One project manager provided us with a list of
items concerning his relationship with the government which
tended to impede his efforts toward a successful completion
of the program. Although all these complaints do not address
the topic at hand, some do. It is instructive to examine the
entire listing to obtain a feel for the relative breadth and
depth of concern regarding those items relating to production
management—those marked with an asterisk.
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1. The "adversary system" that seems to develop
naturally on FFP and FPI type contracts.
2. Communication v/ith the program office (PO)
is in reality communication \vith four separate
entities
:
a. program director and staff
b. the technical community
c. the logistic support community
d. the procurement community




Procurement is not under the control of the
program director.
5. Differences of opinion and attitudes between the
program director/technical community and the
procurement community.
*6. The attitude that "all contractors are out to
cheat the government."
7. PO often not open in their communications with
the contractor.
8. Changes of program office personnel in the
government.
9. The numbers of different personnel/organizations
the contractor is required to interface with in
the government on a specific program.
*10. Delayed decisions on the part of the government.
11. Interpretations of DOD/service rules and regula-
tion by the program offices.
12. Contractor is often placed in the middle between
the PO and the user.
13. Misunderstandings between the PO and the user.
*14. Coordination of changes with the government.
*15. Unrealistic specifications/requirements and
resulting unrealistic test requirements.
*16. GEE engineering data and hardware deliveries.
17. Late involvement of logistic commands in program





18. Late commitment to a logistic support concept and
maintenance philosophy.
19. Spares procurement not in consonance with main-
tenance philosophy.
*20. Trying to keep a major production program rolling
and still play by all the rules.
*21. Answer shopping.
22. Bypassing the chain of command in communication
with the contractor.
*23. The attitude that the paper is more important than
the equipment—imbalance problem.
24. Certain elements of a program always take a back
seat--like training, training equipment, and
simulation equipment.
In contrast to the academic community, no mention
of producibility was made by this group. This seemed par-
ticularly strange in that one project manager had previously
made his mark in the company as a design engineer.
Interestingly enough, the one common thread that
ran through all conversations with the civilian project
managers v/as their belief in being on the production scene
and "getting down with the people." It would appear that
this attitude is inconsistent with the preceding discussion,
for to effectively mingle with the people involved in the
production process, one would have to be possessed of more
than a superficial knowledge of their methods and procedures.
Their emphasis on this philosophy provided a testimony to the
importance of production management that far outweighed the
negative aspects of many of their previous statements. In
short, when viewed in a "big picture" perspective, the value
of a solid familiarity with the tools of production manage-
ment became clearly evident.
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c. Contractor Production Personnel
The recurrent theme in every conversation with
these people was that the military project management person-
nel (including DCAS , NAVPRO) with which they interfaced v/ere
severely deficient in their knowledge of production manage-
ment matters. Tempering their comments to allow for
parochial interests still did not serve to eliminate this
shortcoming as a valid complaint. The resultant on-scene
education of these project management personnel V7as con-
sidered to be time consuming, costly and avoidable. The
common desire was the wish that these people could be
temporarily assigned to the plant in question for a short
period to upgrade their industrial engineering skills.
d. NAVPRO Staff Personnel
Figure 9, A Typical NAVPRO Organization, depicts
a typical NAVPRO staff structure. Not uncommonly, all
positions except the Administration Director and Contracts
Director are Naval Officers. Recent Navy policy has
emphasized the role that the NAVPRO organization is to play:
Field personnel must have sufficient awareness and under-
standing of a contractor's management philosophy, policy,
problems and internal operations to assure that singular
decisions and questions are considered on the basis of
their effect on significant overall performances. [CNM,
1971]
Given this direction, it was surprising to find that not
only was the feeling strong that the project manager needed
a "terminology only" knowledge of production management but



























































viewed their billets as being of a general management nature
and not requiring any technical or industrial engineering
training. Although the former attitude can be explained by
the desire of the NAVPRO to be allowed to accomplish the
given task without the interference of the project manager,
the latter is difficult to comprehend. It would seemithat
the guidance provided by the above quotation would be, at
best, difficult to implement. Possibly this is a defensive
reaction resulting from a lack of adequate training in the
production management area. The comments of contractor
personnel working in the plants over which the NAVPRO had
cognizance certainly support this explanation.
e. Field Trip Observations
Preliminary to the field trips, it was felt that
some knowledge concerning "what to look for" in industrial
facilities was necessary. A typical article on this topic
stresses getting out of the executive offices and into the
plant where a good procedure is to trace the production of
the end item backwards all the while taking note of such
items as personnel attitudes, cleanliness, inspection proce-
dures, and the flow of work in progress [WILSON, 1971]. This
proved to be an excellent technique for developing a good
"feel" for the operations of a plant.
As was alluded to earlier, a goal of these field
trips was to attempt to obtain a good grasp of the principles
of "making things." Through an appropriate selection of the
industries and plants to be visited, this goal was achieved.
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The key element in achieving this level of knowledge was the
recognition that the procedures utilized in producing the end
product vary drastically with two items in particular
—
plant
capacity and age of production machinery and techniques.
Thus, the production techniques viewed ranged from ultra-
modern, numerically controlled, multi-process machinery to
hand construction and plants operating from 25% to 125% of
full capacity were visited.
The end result of these efforts was a reinforce-
ment of the authors' contention that a project manager needs
a solid foundation in production management if he is to
intelligently administer his project staff toward successful
production of his program's end item.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
The overwhelming impression to be gained by a review of
the literature of production management is that, historically,
the industrial engineer has had and continues to have an
identity crisis. A 1968 study, lamenting the plight of the
practicing industrial engineer, noted that management was not
only guilty of perpetrating this attitude, but was even
reluctant to admit that he served a useful function. Further,
the industrial engineer was not uncommonly referred to as an
"efficiency expert" or a "necessary evil" [IRON AGE, 1968].
Indications that this attitude has also been present
in the military systems acquisition process can be found in a
recent book. The High Priests of Waste , by A. E. Fitzgerald.
Fitzgerald portrays the Systems Analysis groups within the DOD
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as discounting the value of industrial engineering techniques
and measurements much to the detriment of the programs con-
cerned. Further, he found that:
Production control techniques which had been carefully-
evolved and refined over a period of sixty to seventy
years were effectively abandoned. Orders for parts to be
made in the factories would be released and immediately
lost. Hordes of 'expediters' or 'part chasers' would then
be unleashed to find the orders and shepherd the parts
through the manufacturing process. By dint of much
scurrying about, the parts chasers would round up enough
parts to assemble a missile from tim.e to time. [FITZGERA.LD
,
1972]
Evidence that this grappling for an identity for the
discipline of production management is also prevalent in the
academic community can also be found. While stating that top
policy managers must have a substantive knowledge of this
field and be capable of intelligent conversation with the
designers, planners, and implementers of production systems,
one source allowed as how:
Production management, in some form, is a logical consti-
tuent of most engineering curricula. The question there-
fore arises whether this topic rightfully belongs within
less technical, business school curriculum. Although
production has the connotation of being strictly an
engineering function, managers make decisions about
production matters using economic or even political
criteria that are superimposed on the engineer's techno-
logical alternatives. There is a technical content to
the managerial aspects of production management and decision
making that is different from the technology of processing
materials or providing services. It is this technical
content that comprises the substance of business programs
in general and production management in particular.
[GAVETT, 19 68]
Given this ambivalent attitude toward the industrial
engineer, an examination of his parent discipline and the
project management process is suggested. Without much risk
of being controversial, it is safe to say that a major goal
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of production management is economical production. Three
fundamental criteria can be recognized to support this goal:
[ARMSTEAD, 19 69]
1. a simple design that fulfills the minimum specifications
2. material selection process that considers workability/
machinability along with cost and specifications.
3. manufacturing process selection that emphasizes
meeting specifications at minimum unit costs.
Any serious student of the project management process as
applied to military systems acquisition policy will recognize
this philosophy as part and parcel of the guidance given to
project managers. So, it would seem, the goals of the project
manager and production manager are not only compatible, but
convergent.
While the charter of the project management concept in
the military, DOD Directive 5000.1, is a very general docu-
ment, there is much documentation within the individual
services that allude to the interplay of production manage-
ment and the project management process. For example, within
the Navy, a specific level of project management relevant to
Weapons Systems Acquisition is identified as Industrial
Management IHALLADAY, 1970]. Further, the publication.
Introduction to Military Program Management , authored by the
Logistics Management Institute, provides the sound advice
of one project manager:
You are deep in contractor problems from the beginning.
If you are going to do your job right, you have to ]<:now
your major contractors—their history, organization,
people, and the way they do business. To understand a
contractor
,
you have to knov; something about what
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motivates business in general. Industry goes to great
lengths to learn everything it can about its customer
—
the government. A program manager should do no less in
learning about his major suppliers. [LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTE, 1971]
The publication goes on to point out that their appraisal of
the situation perceives that contractors are more apt to
respond to the candid appraisals of the project manager
gained through personal involvement with the company's
management team and effort.
As proof that production management is also considered a
desirable item in the project management concept as practiced
in the civilian community, consider the following quotation:
The problems faced by a Project Manager with a lack of
technical expertise are that he may lose technical control
of a project and cause resentment on the part of partici-
pants who feel that he does not understand their position.
A lack of technical expertise may also adversely affect the
decision-making process. The project manager must either
rely on team members for technical decisions or delay the
decision until he can consult a third party. Participants
may interpret this latter action as a lack of trust and
respect for their professional competence. [GEMMILL et al
,
1970]
Recently increased emphasis has been placed on production
management disciplines with the advent of the SHOULD COST
concept. This technique has as its goal the detailed
evaluation of a contractor's cost and performance data in
order to determine a government position as to what the pro-






Three significant facts can be deduced if the findings
of the separate research area of Section IV are compared to
each other and the production management-project management
environment depicted in Section III. They are:
1. The occupants of project manager positions or their
equivalent generally feel that a cursory knov;ledge of pro-
duction management is sufficient to accomplish their objec-
tives. This self-perception is to be contrasted with the
feeling of lower echelon members of the project managem.ent
team who feel that a solid foundation in this area is highly
desirable.
2. The "terminology only" philosophy manifested by many
project managers is in conflict with the explicit attention
to production management considerations made necessary by
the depth with which production management is shown to
permeate the system life cycle.
3. In many instances, the denial by project managers of
the necessity for a solid foundation in production management
was contradicted by their personal behavior in meeting the
requirements of their programs. Specifically, a "crash
course" in production management was instituted in one case
simply to overcome or avoid a problem relating to production.
Given these attitudes by personnel in high levels of
management it is no wonder that production management has
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taken a back seat to more academic oriented disciplines which
can be mastered in the confines of the executive offices.
Given the track record to date on many major acquisition
programs, both civilian and military, one might conclude that
the development of a more solid foundation in production
management for project management personnel would be worthy
of consideration. At a minimum, it is important to ensure
that if the project manager himself does not have experience
in production management, then an individual possessing this
experience should be assigned to his staff.
The personal experiences of the authors in conducting
this study indicate that a grasp of production management is
best attained in the industrial environment itself where
daily exposure to "hov; things are made" and the observation
of the producers in action strip away the sterile entrapments
of academia. One solution then might be to ensure that
project management personnel receive some exposure to
industrial facilities prior to assuming their assigned
duties. To quote one civilian program manager when presented
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